Abstract-Participatory sensing (PS) systems rely on the willingness of mobile users to participate in the collection and reporting of data using a variety of sensors either embedded or integrated in their cellular phones. However, this new data collection paradigm has not been very successful yet mainly because of the lack of incentives for participation. Although several incentive schemes have been proposed to encourage user participation, none has used location information and imposed budget and coverage constraints, which will make the scheme more realistic and efficient. We propose a recurrent reverse auction incentive mechanism with a greedy algorithm that selects a representative subset of the users according to their location given a fixed budget. Compared to existing mechanisms, our incentive scheme improves the area covered by more than 60 percent acquiring a more representative set of samples after every round while maintaining the same number of active users in the system and spending the same budget.
I. INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION
Participatory Sensing (PS) systems rely on cellular phone users to sense and transmit measurements of the variables of interest to a data collection entity in charge of monitoring or addressing a particular problem. Given the large number of cellular users, PS systems have the potential to acquire large amounts of data from places not possible today and address large-scale societal problems [2] , [4] , [9] . A typical example of a PS system involves sensing and reporting air quality measurements to assess the pollution of a particular city, county, state, or even an entire country.
One of the main problems in PS systems is to ensure user participation. Users might not be willing to use their resources and participate unless they receive something in return. In some cases, the incentive mechanism is implicit in the system because the participant receives a direct benefit from the data that is being collected. In other cases, the inclusion of mechanisms to encourage their participation is essential, most of the time in the form of a monetary reward [3] . In this paper, we focus our attention on this latter case.
One approach normally used to reward participants and guarantee their participation is based on reverse auctions [7] . We also use this approach here. One of the advantages of reverse auctions is that they involve participants in a race to sell their sensing samples and the auctioneer generally purchases the cheapest m ones, reducing the cost of maintaining the system working. On the down side, in reverse auctions users may drop out of the system, jeopardizing the system altogether, and therefore special mechanisms must be included to avoid this situation.
Although current incentive schemes have been shown to achieve their goals, most of them have not considered the location of the users, the coverage, and budget constraints in their algorithms, which are causes of major inefficiencies. For example, although it is economically advantageous to buy the m samples with the lowest cost in every auction round, the users may all be physically located very close to each other, rendering pretty much the same information. In contrast, an incentive mechanism with location and coverage constraints will not only buy the least expensive samples but also the ones that are better distributed throughout the area of interest. Also, it is not practical to assume that the auctioneer will always have an unlimited budget to run the system, and therefore, including a limited budget per round makes more sense.
In this paper we combine the Reverse Auction Dynamic Price with Recruitment (RADP-VPC-RC) mechanism proposed in [7] and the Greedy Budgeted Maximum Coverage (GBMC) algorithm included in [5] to create the Greedy Incentive Algorithm (GIA), a reverse auction-based incentive mechanism that not only includes provisions to retain the users but also obtain the lowest cost samples that are best distributed to cover the area of interest within a given budget.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II includes a brief literature review. Section III describes the RADP-VPC-RC algorithm, upon which we base our location-based incentive mechanism. Section IV explains how the Greedy Budgeted Maximum Coverage (GBMC) algorithm addresses the coverage issue within the budget constrain. Section V presents the evaluation of the proposed incentive mechanism. Finally, Section VI concludes the paper and provides brief directions for future research.
II. RELATED WORK
This section contains a short description of previous works and developments in this area. Denzis, Lewis, and Anderson [1] use techniques from economics and psychology to address the problem of compensating people to get and use their location data. The experimental subjects were led to believe that a sealed-bid secondprice auction was running on the value for which they would be willing to disclose their location (privacy). The study determines the level of non participation and the level of dropout, which are essential to discover the value that users give to their location data. This study can be used as a reference to set the parameters of the reverse auction scheme proposed here.
Authors such as Shaw [11] and Yan [12] explore crowdsourcing as a recruiting mechanism and Reddy, Estrin, Hansen, and Srivastava in [10] explore the use of micro-payments, i.e., transactions in which small tasks are matched with small payments, as an incentive mechanism. A pilot experiment is carried out with the participation of fifty five people and the use of five different types of micro-payments: a lump sum payment (MACRO), medium micropayment (MEDIUM), high micro-payment (HIGH), low micropayment (LOW), and competition-based (COMPETE), being this last one the only dynamic method. Their results show that HIGH and MEDIUM were the most successful schemes, MACRO and LOW yielded poor results in terms of the number of photos submitted, and several of the participants in the COMPETE group dropped out. This study reveals that flat rates, like the MACRO scheme, do not encourage user participation and dynamic schemes like COMPETE produce fatigue and turns out in users dropping out of the system. Experiments made by Lee and Hoh [7] show that the problem of fixed pricing (micro-payments) is to determine the right amount of money for each task since a high price can result in a non viable strategy from an economic point of view and a low price can discourage user participation. They also show that dynamic schemes lose participants over time. They propose the Reverse Auction Based Dynamic Price Scheme (RADP-VPC-RC), which allows people to sell their sensing data by participating in a dynamic price reverse auction system. This scheme includes several mechanisms to maintain a minimum number of participants in the system, allows people with different expectations of reward to remain in the system, and recruits members that have dropped out of the system, all typical problems in recurrent reverse auctions systems. Although RADP-VPC-RC reduces the price of the samples by means of the competition among the participants, it does not address the problems of data redundancy, coverage, and budget constraints that we tackle here. The RADP-VPC-RC scheme is better described in the next section, as our GIA scheme is based on it.
III. THE REVERSE AUCTION BASED DYNAMIC PRICE SCHEME (RADP-VPC-RC)
Reverse auction mechanisms seem to be an appealing alternative to analyze adequate means to provide incentives to users [8] . As the entity (auctioneer) is willing to reward the users (active bidders) to obtain the sensing data, the users will compete to obtain those rewards for their information. Thus, prices will typically decrease over time. In this context, the rewards paid by the entity interested in the data gathered by user xi are based on the user's bid price (bi). The bid price is the sum of the true valuation ti expected by the user, i.e., the cost that the user incurs to carry out the process of sensing, in terms of energy, privacy concerns, time, etc., plus any additional margin that will allow the user to have some profit out of the transaction.
One of the advantages of the RADP-VPC-RC mechanism is that it grants a virtual participation credit v r i = v r−1 i + α (VPC), where α is the credit amount, to those users who lost in an auction round r. This approach keeps the bidders participating, as it increases their chances to win using their virtual bid price b
rather than the real bid price. This virtual credit keeps increasing while the user is losing but it is set to zero as soon as the user wins. Another important element of RADP-VPC-RC is the Return on Investment (ROI) indicator, which is used as a criterion to determine when a user is dropping out of the system. The ROI is represented as follows:
where, e r i corresponds to the earned reward by user i until round r, p r i .ti corresponds to the minimum reward, with p r i as the number of participation instances of i up to the current auction round r, ti as the user's true valuation, and βi as the tolerance period. Users evaluate the S r i value every round; if it is below a certain threshold, then they drop out of the system. In addition, RADP-VPC-RC provides a rejoin mechanism, which allows the auctioneer to communicate the maximum winning price ϕ k to the users that dropped out of the system. The knowledge of this price allows the users to re-evaluate their ROI and potentially return to the system in the next auction round. This expected ROI is evaluated as follows:
IV. THE GREEDY INCENTIVE ALGORITHM (GIA)
The GIA algorithm is a combination of the RADP-VPC-RC and the GBMC algorithms. While RADP-VPC-RC tackles the problem of cost explosion and avoids users from dropping out of the system, GBMC considers the location of the users, the coverage, and the budget constraints of the auctioneer. With these two algorithms together, GIA buys samples within the spatial and temporal coverage needed under a fixed budget. Further, GIA does not assume static users and rather includes additional mechanisms to encourage user mobility as a mean to extend the geographical coverage even further.
A. Geometric Coverage Model
In order to address the coverage problem, GIA uses the following geometric disk model
where d(ui, uj) is the Euclidean distance between a sensor ui and another sensor uj and R > 0 is a constant that defines the area of coverage of each sensor. Indeed, this function defines a disk centered at sensor ui with radius R. All sensors within such a disk have a coverage measure of 1 and are said to be covered by sensor ui.
On the other hand, all sensors outside such a disk have a coverage measure of 0 and are said to be not covered by this sensor.
B. Relationship between Geometric and Auction Models
One of main characteristics of the GIA algorithm for sample acquisition consists in the modification of the RADP-VPC-RC auction scheme. This auction mechanism is meant to buy k units in increasing order of cost. In our scheme, we use the geometric coverage model described before to carry out this process. Here, every sensor is drawn as a disk of radius R centered at its location. Of course, each sensor is covered by at least the disk centered at itself. The natural question here is: Does there exist a sub-collection of disks whose union cover all the points? If we assign the elements covered by diski to the set Si for i = 1, . . . , n, where n is the number of disks, the previous problem becomes the well-known NP-Complete Set Cover Problem.
C. The Algorithm
At the heart of our incentive mechanism is the Greedy Budgeted Maximum Coverage (GBMC) algorithm, which is executed in every round of the auction to decide which samples to buy. The algorithm, which is detailed in pseudocode in Algorithm 1, finds a S ⊆ S that covers the greatest possible area covered by S within the budget constraint.
Let us assign the elements covered by each diski to each set Si, associate the weight wi of Si as its cardinality, and its cost ci as the cost of the sample provided by the sensor ui located at the center of the diski. Let G⊆S be a collection of sets, w(G) and c(G) denote the total number of elements covered by G and the total cost of the sets in G, respectively. Let W i , i = 1, . . . , n, denote the total number of elements covered by set Si but not covered by any set in G. Our problem now can be stated as follows: Given a set U of n elements, a collection {Si}, i = 1, . . . , n of subsets of S, and a budget L, find a subset S ⊆S such that the total cost of elements in S does not exceed L and the total weight of elements covered by S is maximized. This NP-hard problem, presented by Kuller [5] in 1999, is known as the Budgeted Maximum Coverage Problem.
Algorithm 1, which is the greedy algorithm proposed in [5] to solve the BMC problem, solves this problem in three steps. Rather than buying the cheapest k samples, it acquires samples using the following criteria. The first step uses the sub-routine GREEDY AREA Algorithm 1: The Greedy Budgeted Maximum Coverage Algorithm for GIA.
input : S a collection of sets made up by the user locations output: S ⊆ S, covering set
, which takes as input the collection S and selects at each step a set Si that maximizes the ratio W i /ci. The second step uses the sub-routine GREEDY AREA(S), which selects at each step a set Sj that maximizes W j constrained to the budget. The collections G and G returned by the first and second sub-routines are the candidates for the final output. Finally, the last step uses the sub-routine GBM C(), which outputs the candidate solution having the maximum weight.
Clearly, the weight or number of elements covered by the collections G and G depends on R. When R tends to zero, the number of elements in Si tends to 1 and the expression W i /ci becomes 1/ci, which reaches its maximum when ci reaches its minimum. In this case, the RADP-VPC-RC and our GIA systems are equivalent. However, as the length of the radius is increased, more samples are included in diski, and once a sample provided by ui is purchased all the samples within a distance less than or equal to R are considered covered (redundant) and are discarded as candidates to be acquired. Section V presents an analysis about the influence of radius R over the number of active participants, average cost per round, and coverage.
D. Budget
One of the main assumptions made in most previous works is that of an infinite budget to run the auctions. This assumption is not realistic in practice, as data collectors may have budget constraints. In our proposed mechanism, the system runs with a limited budget. We consider a global budget that is evenly divided by the number of rounds or auctions. However, at the end of each round ri, if the total amount of budget assigned to round ri is not used completely, then the remaining part is added to round ri + 1.
E. Advantages of the GBMC Algorithm
This section illustrates the advantages in terms of coverage of using the GBMC compared with other popular algorithms such as the Greedy Set Cover (GSC) algorithm presented by Kleimberg and Tardos [6] , which maximizes W i /ci and corresponds to the subroutine GREEDY AREA PRICE of the Algorithm 1.
The following example illustrates how the GBMC overcomes problems where the well-known GCS algorithm fails. Given a deployment of N users in a target area, and radius R, consider the following scenario. Two users (sensors), u1 and u2, cover 1 and p users respectively including themselves, in other words, their samples have weighs W 1 = 1, and W 2 = p. Let us assign the costs ci = 1 and c2 = p + 1 for these samples and let us define the total budget L = p + 1. In this situation, Algorithm 1 acquires u2 whereas the GSC algorithm purchases u1. Remember that the optimal solution consists of covering the maximum number of participants given a budget. Let us assign p = 10. In this case, GSC tries to maximize W i /ci for i = 1, 2, which results in the purchase of u1 because W 1 /c1 > W 2 /c2 given that W 1 = 1, c1 = 1, W 2 = 10, c2 = 10 + 1. However, in the second round there is not enough budget to acquire u2 because one unit has been spent in the first round and the remaining 10 units of budget are not enough to acquire u2. In contrast, by using the budgeted approach, GBMC first uses the sub-routine GREEDY AREA PRICE that returns the decision to acquire u1, as the GSC algorithm does; however, the final decision is postponed until it compares it with the decision returned by the GREEDY AREA sub-routine. GREEDY AREA, on the other hand, acquires the sample ui that maximizes the number of elements covered W i without violating the budget for i = 1, 2. In this case GREEDY AREA acquires u2 because W 2 > W 1 . The final decision is taken by the final routine GBMC() that takes as input the results returned by the two prior sub-routines and decides which of the results will be acquired comparing the number of elements covered by each one. So, in this case, the final decision is to purchase u2. Although in this case there is not enough budget to buy the other sample in the next round either, it is important to emphasize that the purchasing entity will cover the same area but will be left with more money. Nonetheless, when there is enough money to buy many samples in many rounds, this three step process will show its performance advantage over the other one, in particular, in terms of coverage. This advantage will be shown later in the paper.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
This section describes how we modeled the different parts of the PS system and presents the results of the performance evaluation comparing the proposed GIA mechanism versus RADP-VPC-RC.
A. Modeling the PS System Components
The GIA incentive mechanism works in rounds, as follows. Initially, a number of users are randomly distributed over the area of interest. For this, we used 2-dimensional uniform and normal distributions with the parameters shown in Table I . Those users who are located in the area of interest receive a message announcing that a new round is about to start. Users interested in the auction set their true valuations ti, which are randomly generated. We perform experiments using a normal, uniform, or exponential distribution with the parameters specified in Table I . For each ti, a bid price bi is randomly generated from a uniform distribution between ti and 1.5ti. Then, the system generates a set of user locations, which are associated to the bid prices. With this information, a file indexed by user IDs is generated to allow us to track the behavior of the users through the different rounds. This file serves as the input to Algorithm 1 that determines which and how many samples will be purchased given the bid price, the location of the users, and the budget per round. At this point, Algorithm 1 chooses the winners of the round, those users to whom the system will buy the samples from. Subsequently, 50% of those winners, randomly selected, increase their bid prices by 10% and all the losers decrease their bid price by 20%. Then, all the participants increase their participation counter by 1. Next, the losers evaluate their Return of Investment (ROI) index using Equation 1. If this value is above a pre-defined threshold, equal to 0.5 in this work, they remain participating in the auction; otherwise, they drop out. At this point, the system sends the highest price paid per sample and the locations that were not covered in the previous round to those users who dropped out of the system in previous rounds. Using this privileged information, these users (losers) evaluate their chances of winning in the next round evaluating his ROI function for the next round using Equation 2. If this value is above the threshold, they rejoin the system with a 50% probability; otherwise, they remain out of the auctions. Also, users could use the location information to move to different areas and increase their chances to win the auction. This process continues and losers constantly receive this privileged information and test their chances to rejoin. The entire process repeats until a series of n different rounds are carried out, which in our case n = 1000, or the data collector runs out of money. It is worth mentioning that, for comparison purposes, the values utilized in all the parameters described in this paragraph are the same ones used by the authors of RADP-VPC-RC in [7] .
Another part of the system that needs to be modeled in the simulation tool is the user mobility. As stated before, we do not assume static users. After a random initial deployment, the mobility algorithm computes the locations of the participants for the next round using a displacement vector ( − → R ) that contains their displacement from the previous round. This vector is defined as the addition of a displacement vector on the X axis ( − → X ) and another vector on the
The displacement vector on each axis is generated using a random function (i.e., (−1) uni(0,2) ) that defines the mobility direction. Note that the magnitude of the vector represents the participant's speed, which value is generated as the multiplication of the number of steps, randomly generated between 0 and 3, times the step length, randomly generated between 0 and 11.
B. Experiments
Three sets of experiments are included. The first set is meant to determine the ideal length of radius R. Once an ideal R is found, the second set consists of experiments to compare the average number of active participants and the average cost per round between the RADP-VPC-RC and GIA algorithms using different distributions for user true valuations. Finally, the third set of experiments is meant to demonstrate the superiority of the GIA algorithm in terms of coverage under conditions of stratified locations of the participants in the area of interest.
1) Experiment 1: Determining the Ideal Length of Radius R:
In order to study the relationship between the radius R and the number of active participants and the average price per round, the length of R was increased from 1 to 10 in steps of one. One thousand rounds were executed and the experiment was repeated 50 times and the results averaged using a fixed budget of 100 units per round. For every length of R, the average number of active participants was recorded. This process was carried out using three different distributions for the true valuations of the users and the uniform distribution for the initial deployment of the participants. The idea behind this experiment is to find the length of the radius R for which the average number of active participants decreases significantly. Figure 1 shows that when the radius R is increased beyond 5, the number of active participants decreases regardless of the distribution. This is based on the following rationale. If the radius is set as long as the distance from the center of the user to the farthest point, the algorithm will only buy one sample because this disk will cover the entire population. However, from the sensing point of view, the sensed data might not be a good representation of the real values in all places. On the other hand, if the radius is too small, the algorithm will buy more samples than necessary, as the users are too close to each other and the data will present a high level of redundancy. In short, there is a tradeoff between the radius R and the granularity and quality of the sensed data. Figure 2 shows that if the radius is bigger than 5, the GIA algorithm does not use all the allocated budget per round to buy samples. However, when R ≤ 5 the algorithm still uses the entire budget per round. Putting the results of these two figures together, we conclude that a value of R = 5 provides a good level of participation while rendering non redundant data. In practice, however, the value of R is fixed and has to be set to a number that considers how the variable of interest changes with the distance.
2) Experiment 2: Comparing the Performance Metrics.:
The main goal of this experiment is to determine the number of active users in the system as the budget per round is increased from 20 to 200 when the users set their true valuations using a normal distribution with µ = 5 and σ = 2, an exponential distribution with µ = 5, and a uniform distribution between [0, 10] . In the case of the GIA algorithm, a radius R = 5 was used. Figure 3 shows that both algorithms present a very similar performance buying a similar number of samples per round per budget. This result basically says that both algorithms, GIA and RADP-VPC-RC, include effective methods for user participation and rejoining the system. However, we know that although the number of active users are similar, the GIA algorithm buys samples in a different manner since it avoids to buy samples from close by places that will render fairly similar or redundant data.
3) Experiment 3: Comparing Coverage.: The main goal of this experiment is to compare the amount of the area of interest covered by the GIA and RADP-VPC-RC algorithms. For this purpose a stratified scenario was simulated. This scenario could correspond to the case where participants from different socioeconomic status having different true valuations live in distinct regions of the area (city). In this scenario the RADP-VPC-RC algorithm does not choose a representative sample of the population and instead, purchases data containing a high level of redundancy, as can be seen from Figure 4 (a). On the other hand, GIA is able to buy non-redundant samples from each of the user types, as shown in Figure 4(b) . The initial user deployment of locations was generated with a cluster structure. Four clusters with µ1 = (30, 80), µ2 = (80, 80), µ3 = (50, 50), and µ4 = (90, 30) respectively, and covariance matrix Cov = 40 0 0 40
were generated with 25 locations each, for a total of 100 locations. The true valuations of the users were generated using normal distri- butions with µ1 = 5, µ2 = 10, µ3 = 15, µ4 = 20, and σ = 2. Each cluster of true valuation was associated with a cluster of location in order to simulate the expected scenario. Figure 5 shows the percentage of area covered, the number of active participants, and total cost per round for the two algorithms as the number of samples acquired varies from 5 to 50 in steps of 5. From Figures 5(a) and 5(b) , it is clear that both algorithms have a similar number of active participants and spend a similar amount of money to buy their samples; however, as it is shown in Figure 5 (c), it is also clear that the GIA algorithm buys those samples from users who are more spread throughout the entire area of interest, thus providing a better coverage and therefore reducing the acquisition of redundant data. For example, this last figure shows that when fifty samples are acquired, the GIA algorithm covers up to 64% more area than RADP-VPC-RC.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
This paper presents the Greedy Incentive Algorithm (GIA), a location-based reverse auction incentive mechanism for participatory sensing systems with budget constraints. The algorithm uses the location of the users to improve the coverage of the area of interest and reduce the collection of redundant data. Simulation results show the superiority of the GIA algorithm compared with RADP-VPC-RC, another reverse auction mechanism found in the literature. In general, the GIA algorithm is shown to increase the area coverage by up to 64% while maintaining a similar amount of active users in the system and spending a similar budget than the RADP-VPC-RC algorithm.
Future work is under way to model the dynamic admission of new users, as the continuous admission of new members in any round might be useful to find an equilibrium among the average number of active participants, fair prices paid per the sample, and the budget constrains. We want to investigate the use of Game Theory to further analyze these systems. We are also looking at more realistic models to simulate R and the mobility of the users as well as different ways to establish the true price and ROI for different users.
